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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DENISE A. HIRSCH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant. 
vs. 
FRANK L. HIRSCH, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action in Divorce, arising from defendant-
respondent's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce, 
seeking custody of the minor child, Cody, age, five years old. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Judge Dean E. Conder of the Third District 
Court, having made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
entered an Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, changing 
custody of the minor child from mother to the father. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant-mother seeks reversal of said modification, 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 20966 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties disagree on several points in their statement 
of facts. Respondent's brief states that he had "custody" 
of the minor child prior to the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce, and from April 1984 until February 1985. Such 
statements are incorrect in that the term"custody" implies 
possession, care and control of a child pursuant to an Order 
of the Court. 
Prior to May of 1984 there was no court Order of custody 
of this child. From May of 1984 until February of 1985 
appellant-mother did in fact have legal custody of the child 
pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. Therefore, respondent's 
claim of having "custody" for these periods are simply untrue, 
misleading, and a misrepresentation of the actual circumstances. 
Respondent's brief incorrectly states that appellant-mother's 
last move was to the state of California (p.2 of respondent's 
brief). The correct statement of fact is that appellant-mother's 
last move was back to the state of Utah to West Valley City, 
where she has now resided since April of 1985. 
Appellant-mother's husband did not state (as claimed by 
respondent, p. 2) that he wanted respondent-father to take 
custody of the child. His actual statement from the transcript 
(p. 35, L11-13) was: 
"I wanted him to take him when me and Denise 
had a honeymoon, to take Cody for a month, is 
what I said." 
Appellant-mother's husband never requested that there be 
an actual change in custody of the child. 
Respondent's brief refers in several places to 
appellant-mother's use of cocaine (respondent's brief p. 2, 
3, 6, 9). A review of the transcript shows that the only 
evidence or reference to use of cocaine was that she used 
it "once or twice, years ago" (Transcript p. 85,L25). In 
fact, the only time she tried it was with respondent-father 
before the child Cody was ever born. 
There was no evidence that even suggested the use of 
cocaine after the child was born, or after the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce. Respondent's repetitive reference to 
appellant's cocaine use is inappropriate, without basis 
in fact, and is highly prejudicial. 
Respondent-father's claim of having established that 
he had possession of the child a majority of the time, is 
untrue. Even the Trial Court did not make a finding as to 
which party had possession of the child a majority of the 
time,as this was a highly disputed issue in this matter, and 
in its remarks the Court stated (Transcript p. 98) as follows: 
"The evidence is very contradictory as to who Cody 
was actually living with. You say he was living with you 
during that time and she says no, he was living with me. 
This one says no, he was living with her, and they say no, 
he was living with you and you say Judge, in your great 
wisdom, tell us whicli one of these two, where he was actually 
living with. That's difficult to do." 
Even the Findings of Fact do not state which parent 
had possession of the child a majority of the time. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR A FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT 
OF A SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The prevailing rule of law on the issue of changing 
prior order of custody of minor children is set forth 
in the case of Hogge v. Hogge, 649 Pac 2d 51 (Utah 1982). 
The Supreme Court in that case set forth the requirement 
of a two-step procedure in modifying a prior custody order. 
The first step requires a finding that a "substantial" and 
"material" change of circumstance must have occured "since 
time of previous decree" to warrant a change in custody. If 
such a findings is made then the second step is to make a 
determination,de novo/ as to custody based on the best interests 
of the child. 
Respondent relies on three claimed changes in circumstances 
throughout his brief, as follows: 
A. POSSESSION OF THE CHILD. Respondent-father claims 
he had possession of the child a majority of the time before 
the decree of divorce was entered, therefore, his objection 
to the mother being awarded custody should have been pursued 
prior to entry of the original decree. He voluntarily agreed 
that mother should have custody of the child prior to the 
entry of the decree, and therefore that issue is now res judicata, 
and can not be modified as he has not shown a "substantial" and 
"material" change in circumstances since the entry of the decree 
on that basis, 
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B. APPELLANT MOTHER'S CHANGE OF RESIDENCE. There is 
evidence that appellant-mother moved several times. However 
there is no evidence that these moves were detrimental in 
any way to her ability to care for the child, or had any 
effect on the child's well-being. It is only reasonable that 
a person who has moved out of a marital home, been single for 
a while, and remarries is going to have a change in residence. 
There was no evidence as to how may times appellant-mother 
moved prior to the entry of the divorce decree, and how may 
times she moved after entry of the decree. Therefore, again 
there is no showing that this change of residence was a 
"substantial" and "material" change in circumstance, and 
the issue is now res judicata. Respondent-father should have 
raised this issued prior to the entry of the original decree. 
C. COCAINE USE. As stated previously, the only evidence 
as to the use of cocaine was that appellant-mother had tried 
it "once or twice, years ago". There is absolutely no evidence 
that any cocaine use took place after the entry of the decree. 
Therefore, this basis for claim of changed circumstances is 
also without merit. 
The trial court therefore, abused its discretion in finding 
a change of circumstances. Respondent-father simply did not 
meet his burden of proof, as there was no real basis for 
a finding of a change in circumstances since the decree of 
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divorce was entered. 
II. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR A FINDING THAT IT IS IN 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD TO BE IN THE CUSTODY OF 
RESPONDENT-FATHER. 
In making a determination on the second step of the 
change in custody process, the Court must look to what is 
reasonable and necessary for the best interests of the child. 
The factors to be considered are set forth in Hutchinson vs. 
Hutchinson, 649 Pac 2d 38, and it is doubtful that the trial 
court considered those guidelines in making its decision. 
In fact, the trial court felt that this was not a clear 
cut case and obviously had somtserious doubts about its 
decision in this matter, stating in the memorandum decision: 
"The Court has agonized long and hard as to 
what will be best for Cody". 
However, the trial court did find that both parties were 
adequate parents, and in view of the guidelines set forth 
in Hutchinson, supra, it is clear that a change in the prior 
custody order was an abuse of discretion. 
The following factors weigh heavily in showing that 
the best interests of the child would more readily be served 
by appellant-mother retaining custody of the child: 
A. The child has a strong bond with both parents. 
B. Appellant-mother is at home during the day and 
can provide personal care for the child. 
C. Respondent-father works long hours and must 
hire surrogate care for the child. 
D. Mother is married, has a stable marital relationship, 
and can provide a normal family situation for the child, 
E. Father remains single, and can not provide the 
child with a stable family unit. 
F. The child is only five years old, an age where 
he is still in need of the care and nurturing of his mother. 
The appellant-mother's only flaw, if it can be 
considered a flaw, was to allow respondent-father liberal 
visitation with her son. The evidence shows that she tried 
to act reasonably in regard to visitation so that father and 
son could maintain their relationship, while she maintained 
the care and custody of the child. In fact, she unknowingly 
had all along created the ideal custodial parent situation 
which Judge Conder described in his closing statements to 
the parties from the bench, as follows: 
"I would like to see Cody grow up to know both of 
you as his parents. The ideal situation would be to have 
it so that if Cody wanted to go and visit you, Frank, this 
afternoon, he could hop on the bus, or if he went down into 
the neighborhood and went where he was and he would see Frank. 
If he wanted to spend tomorrow with Denise because she was 
going to do something, he would do that. He should grow up 
feeling that you two are his parents. And he has the right 
to go in your home just as he had it before. He's your child 
and he's free to come and go to your home as your child." 
(Transcript p.98 L19 - p.99 L4) 
It seems that the mother's willingness to cooperate 
with her ex-husband with liberal visitation is being used 
against her in this matter, which is highly inequitable, both 
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to appellant-mother and to the child. 
There was no showing that the liberal visitation rights 
which respondent-father enjoyed decreased the child's bond 
with his mother, or reduced the mother's ability to parent 
her only child. On the contrary, it shows her ability to 
act rationally and with maturity in the area of visitation, 
an area which is all too commonly used by custodial parents 
in an attempt to spite an ex-spouse. Appellant-mother should 
be commended for encouraging the father-son relationship, 
while maintaining her care and custody of the child, and 
not have this attribute used against her in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that respondent's interpretation of 
the facts and the arguments, as applied to this case, unduly 
misrepresent the true situation of the parties and the minor 
child who is the subject of this action. 
In his Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce, 
it is respondent-father's burden to prove that a "substantial" 
and "material" change of circumstances occured after entry of 
the Decree of Divorce (May 1984), and that it is in the best 
interests of the child that the prior custody order by changed. 
The record shows that respondent-father simply did not 
meet his burden of proof in this matter, and the Court abused 
its discretion by ordering a change of custody without basis 
as required by this Supreme Court in the rules of law set 
forth in Hogge vs. Hogge, supra, and Hutchinson vs. Hutchinson, 
supra* 
Appellant-mother respectfully requests that the trial 
courts Order Modifying Decree of Divorce be reversed, and 
that she be allowed to retain custody of her only child, Cody. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CATHRYN JAMSON JU0D/ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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